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Abstract
This study investigates the role of free cash flows and (cross-sectional and time-series)
price momentum in predicting future stock returns. Past returns and free cash flows each
positively predict future stock returns after controlling for the other, suggesting that cash
flows and momentum both contain valuable and distinctive information about future stock
returns. A strategy of buying past winners with high free cash flows and shorting past
losers with low free cash flows significantly outperforms the traditional momentum trading
strategy. The enhanced performance is not sensitive to investor sentiment, time variations,
or transaction costs. Further analysis shows that the incremental cash flow effects are
largely attributable to net distributions to equity/debt holders. Overall, our findings shed
light on the role of corporate fundamentals in technical trading strategies.
Keywords
free cash flows, cross-sectional momentum, time-series momentum, fundamental analysis,
technical trading

Introduction
Cash is the lifeblood of a business, yet managers and investors tend to fixate upon earnings
and overlook cash flows. Even sophisticated market participants such as financial analysts
sometimes neglect cash flow information. For example, on January 23, 2018, Netflix Inc.
shares rose by 13% after the company’s fourth-quarter earnings announcement. This
increase was primarily because most analysts believed that the company had done very
well in reported earnings; however, its cash flow generation was ‘‘abysmal and worsening.’’1 In addition, because the U.S. government does not require companies to provide
complete financial statements in quarterly earnings releases, the disclosure of items from
the statement of cash flows remains infrequent (Miao et al., 2016). Accordingly, the
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valuation implications of cash flows are relatively underexamined in previous research
(Adame et al., 2020; Dechow et al., 2008).2 Our study attempts to address this gap in the
literature by examining the role of free cash flows (FCFs) in predicting future stock returns
when interacting with price momentum.
Price momentum was first documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), who find that a
trading strategy of buying past winners and shorting past losers generates significant profits. This anomaly is robust across asset classes, sample periods, and geographic markets
(e.g., Asness et al., 2013; Chan et al., 1996; Griffin et al., 2005), and cannot be explained
by the standard asset pricing models (e.g., Fama & French, 1996; Grundy & Martin, 2001).
Recent research extends the literature from cross-sectional momentum (CSMOM) to timeseries momentum (TSMOM) and finds strong positive predictability from a stock’s own
past returns (e.g., Huang et al., 2020; Moskowitz et al., 2012). The momentum anomaly
has been acknowledged as one of the biggest challenges to asset pricing (Fama & French,
2008, 2016).3
Despite extensive evidence on the robustness of the momentum anomaly, a consensus
has yet to be reached regarding the source of stock return predictability based on past
returns. Chan et al. (1996), the first to explore this question, posit that one important
avenue to understand the price momentum is to explore how it relates to the market’s pricing of fundamental information.4 They link the price momentum to the market’s underreaction to earnings surprises based on the possibility that a stock’s prior 6-month returns
capture the market’s reaction to the most recent earnings surprise. They find that past
returns and past earnings surprises both predict large drifts in future returns after controlling for the other. Subsequent studies extend Chan et al. (1996) by examining how past
returns interact with other key accounting-based measures that carry important messages on
firm performance, including the systematic component of earnings momentum (Chordia &
Shivakumar, 2006), revenue surprise (Chen et al., 2014), and accruals (Gu & Wu, 2020).
However, to the best of our knowledge, the empirical evidence on how the interplay of
FCFs with price momentum predicts future returns is sparse. This omission is unfortunate
given that FCFs are fundamental to firm valuation and price formation (Copeland et al.,
2000). Our study investigates (a) whether the predictability of price momentum is subsumed by FCFs, and (b) whether a trading strategy based on FCFs and past returns generates larger profits than the traditional momentum strategy. We consider both CSMOM and
TSMOM and decompose FCF by their uses—distribution to debt or equity holders—to
gain additional insight on how different sources of cash flows affect price momentum.5
We start by sorting and ranking stocks independently based on their past returns and
FCFs. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Asness et al., 2013; Jegadeesh & Titman,
1993, 2001), we classify stocks with the highest past returns as winners and those with the
lowest past returns as losers. After controlling for the past returns in both two-way analysis
and the Fama–MacBeth regressions, we find that cash flows exhibit significant explanatory
power for future stock returns. We also find that the portfolio payouts are unaffected by
alternative techniques of portfolio formation. Similarly, after controlling for cash flows, we
find that the profitability of the momentum strategy remains robust, with the momentum
profits being higher in low FCF firms. Our results suggest that FCFs and past returns both
contain valuable and distinctive information for forecasting stock returns.6
Next, we propose an enhanced momentum strategy based on the combined signal from
past returns and FCFs (the FCF-based momentum strategy). Our results show that conditioning the momentum trading strategy on cash flows substantially boosts portfolio profits.
Specifically, if we long winner stocks with high cash flows and short loser stocks with low
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cash flows and then hold them for 6 months following the formation month, this net zeroinvestment portfolio will yield monthly returns up to 1.47%. In comparison, the monthly
returns of the traditional price momentum over our sample period are only 0.75%. Besides
the sizable improvement in terms of monthly portfolio returns, the enhanced momentum
strategies also exhibit much smaller downward risks (measured with skewness and kurtosis)
and almost double the Sharpe ratio of the traditional momentum strategy. In the sensitivity
checks, we find that our enhanced momentum strategy outperforms the traditional momentum strategy across different levels of investor sentiment and time periods.
Dechow et al. (2008) argue that, among cash flow components, retained cash flows are
less persistent compared with the distribution parts to equity and debt holders. We predict
that components with relatively high persistence are more likely to be underpriced if investors fixate on earnings. Following Dechow et al. (2008), we decompose FCFs into changes
in the annual cash balance, net distributions to equity holders, and net distributions to debt
holders. As expected, our results show that the underpricing of cash flows is driven by net
cash distributions to equity and debt holders. Portfolios formed on net distributions to
equity holders/debt holders yield significant excess returns in both winner and loser groups.
In addition, the incremental effects of cash flows on the momentum performance correspond predominantly to the net distributions to equity and debt holders.
We have so far reported that the enhanced momentum strategy (i.e., buying past winners
with high cash flows and shorting past losers with low cash flows) generates superior payoffs relative to those that could be achieved by the conventional momentum strategy.
However, some recent papers have proposed several different but not mutually exclusive
explanations of momentum: the accrual anomaly, the growth explanation, the limit of arbitrage, and the risk-based explanation. Therefore, we test whether the superior performance
of the FCF-based momentum strategy can be attributed to these alternative explanations.
First, one may reasonably be concerned that the mispricing of FCFs can be attributable
to the accrual anomaly. To test this alternative explanation, we consider three partition
variables: total accruals, dictionary accruals, and growth in net operating assets. We divide
our sample into high and low accrual groups and repeat our main analysis. Our results suggest that the incremental effect of FCFs on momentum payoffs cannot be fully explained
by the accrual anomaly.
Second, we examine whether limits-to-arbitrage can explain the profits of our enhanced
momentum strategy. Arbitrage is costly. Trading frictions (e.g., transaction costs) may potentially restrict arbitrageurs’ trading behavior, which subsequently causes mispricing (Lam &
Wei, 2011). Arbitrage is also risky. Momentum effects are stronger among high idiosyncratic
volatility stocks (Arena et al., 2008). We employ five proxies for limits-to-arbitrage. If the
superior performance of our enhanced momentum strategy is due to the limit of arbitrage,
then the superiority should disappear in groups with low arbitrage constraints. However, we
find that the enhanced momentum trading strategy yields higher returns than the traditional
momentum strategy in both high and low limits-to-arbitrage groups.
Third, we conduct a series of risk control tests to examine whether the enhanced
momentum effect is attributable to risk. We repeat portfolio analyses after replacing raw
stock returns with size-adjusted returns, size- and book-to-market-adjusted returns, and
industry-adjusted returns. We also estimate alphas for the intersection portfolios using six
conventional asset pricing models. Our results support the conjecture that the momentum
effect and the cash flow effect are distinct and that the enhanced performance of the FCFbased momentum strategy cannot be fully captured by the existing asset pricing models
and common risk factors.
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Finally, we extend the Fama–French (FF) three factors with a mimic factor of earnings
surprises Standardized Unexpected Earnings (SUE factor) to test whether the cash flow
effects, the momentum effects, and the FCF-based momentum strategy can be explained
away by the SUE factor. After controlling for the SUE factor, we find that the cash flow
effects, for both past loser and winner stocks, remain strong, but the profits of the CSMOM
and TSMOM strategies disappear for stocks with high FCF. This suggests that the combined
explanatory effect of FCFs and earnings surprises on price momentum is prominent. In contrast, the FCF-enhanced momentum strategies continue to present superior performance.
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we contribute to the
recent development in the literature that incorporates profitability, investment, and expected
earnings growth, among other factors based on accounting numbers, in explaining future
expected returns (Fama & French, 2015; Hou et al., 2015; Penman & Zhang, 2020;
Penman & Zhu, 2022). Our results suggest that cash flow and past returns contain distinct
information that the market fails to react efficiently. The strong positive association
between cash flows and future returns, after controlling for various risk factors, supports
the notion that investors fixate on earnings and thus underprice cash flows.
Second, our article adds to the research that explores enhanced momentum strategies by
relating firm-specific attributes to the traditional momentum strategies. Prior research has
examined revenue growth (Sagi & Seasholes, 2007), dividends (Asem, 2009), revenue surprise and earnings surprise (Chen et al., 2014), and the quality of governance (Sherif &
Chen, 2019). We show that an enhanced momentum strategy that buys firms with high past
returns and high FCFs and sells firms with low past returns and low FCFs outperforms the
traditional momentum strategy. Unlike the above studies that limit their investigation to
CSMOM, our study examines both CSMOM and TSMOM in a unified setting.7 Results on
the enhanced momentum strategy provide implications on how investors process information contained in cash flows and past returns interactively in pricing stocks.
Third, our study contributes to the accounting literature on the pricing of earnings components and cash flows in particular. When examining how investors process earnings components in pricing stocks, prior research extensively focuses on accruals—the noncash
component of earnings (Fairfield et al., 2003b; S. A. Richardson et al., 2005; Sloan, 1996).
The valuation implications and the market perceptions of cash flows are relatively underexamined (Adame et al., 2020; Cheng & Hollie, 2008). Extant studies on the mispricing of
cash flows mostly investigate whether cash flows are distinct from accruals in predicting
future returns (Cheng & Thomas, 2006; Houge & Loughran, 2000; Hribar & Yehuda,
2015). We extend the literature by providing evidence on how FCFs interact with past
returns in predicting future returns. Our results also show that the underpricing of cash
flow is driven by net cash distributions to equity and debt holders.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The ‘‘Related Literature and
Hypothesis Development’’ section reviews relevant literature on the valuation effect of cash
flows and develops our testable hypotheses. The ‘‘Data and Method’’ section describes the
data and methodology. The empirical results are discussed in the ‘‘Empirical Results’’ and
‘‘Further Analyses’’ sections. The ‘‘Conclusion’’ section concludes the article.

Related Literature and Hypothesis Development
The Valuation Role of Cash Flows
The first strand of literature pertinent to our study relates to the valuation implication of
cash flows. A positive relation between cash-based measures and future returns is well
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documented (Hackel et al., 2000; Houge & Loughran, 2000; Lakonishok et al., 1994). Prior
studies attribute this positive relation to investors’ inability to process cash flow information, and they provide two behavioral explanations. On one hand, because cash-to-price
(C/P) is a common value-glamor proxy, the positive relation between cash flows and future
returns is viewed as value/glamor phenomenon in the finance literature—a fact that value
stocks outperform growth stocks. In an influential paper, Lakonishok et al. (1994) attribute
the superior performance of high C/P stocks (value stocks) to investors’ exceptional errors
on firms’ future growth rates. They find that value stocks are underpriced because investors
extrapolate poor past growth rates into the future and thus are overly pessimistic about
such stocks.
On the other hand, accounting papers tend to attribute investors’ underpricing of cash
flow to their failure to appreciate its high persistence relative to accruals. Sloan (1996)
shows that accruals are less persistent than operating cash flows for 1-year-ahead earnings,
and firms with high (low) accruals tend to have abnormally low (high) future stock returns.
He interprets the results as suggesting that investors fixate on earnings and thus overprice
(underprice) the component of earnings with lower (higher) persistence. Houge and
Loughran (2000) extend Sloan’s (1996) work by documenting approximately 10.4%
annualized excess returns to a trading strategy based on cash flows. They also find that
although cash flows and accruals are negatively related, the hedge portfolios based on cash
flows and those based on accruals contain mostly firms with distinct size, book-to-market,
and persistence characteristics. Desai et al. (2004) and Cheng and Thomas (2006) investigate whether cash flows subsume accruals in predicting future returns and report mixed
results. Hribar and Yehuda (2015) incorporate the firm life cycle concept and find that
FCFs subsume mispricing of total accruals in the maturity and decline stages but not in the
growth stage, consistent with accruals and cash flows containing unique information in the
growth stage. In summary, this strand of literature mainly focuses on whether cash flows
are distinct from accruals in predicting future returns.
Recent accounting research demonstrates that so-called anomalous returns predicted by
accounting numbers reflect normal returns for risk. Theoretical work in Penman and Zhang
(2020) shows how accounting numbers convey information about risk when prepared under
conservative accounting. Penman and Zhang (2021) seek validation of the theory and provide empirical support by examining how the book rate of return is connected to risk and
expected stock returns. A more recent study by Penman and Zhu (2022) connects accounting principles (e.g., clean surplus and earnings recognition) with consumption risk. They
develop an asset pricing model that equates expected returns to accounting metrics that a
priori indicate expected future earnings growth at risk. Given that cash flows are one of the
key accounting characteristics in valuation, these studies suggest a risk-based explanation
of why cash flows predict future returns.
We extend the literature on how the market processes cash flow information by investigating (a) the pricing of cash flows conditional on past returns and (b) the pricing of cash
flow components.

The Momentum Anomaly and the Underreaction Explanation
Our study is also related to the literature on the robustness of price momentum and the
underreaction explanation. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), using a U.S. sample of New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE)/American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stocks from 1965 through
1989, document that a trading strategy of buying stocks that were winners in the past 6
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months and selling those that were losers in the past 6 months generates approximately 1%
monthly returns over the subsequent 6 months. Fama and French (1996) note that momentum effects are not subsumed by their three-factor model. Subsequent papers demonstrate
that the momentum effect cannot be justified with a risk-based explanation and is robust
across securities, sample periods, and international markets (e.g., Asness et al., 2013; Chan
et al., 1996; Griffin et al., 2005). While early studies on momentum focus primarily on
CSMOM, recent research documents significant TSMOM (e.g., Huang et al., 2020;
Moskowitz et al., 2012).
A large body of research attempts to elucidate momentum by studying investors’ reactions to firm-specific information and how such information is incorporated into stock
prices. Behavioral models show that momentum arises mainly from underreaction to information due to conservatism in expectation updating (Barberis et al., 1998), slow information diffusion (Hong & Stein, 1999), and the disposition effect (i.e., investor’s tendency to
ride losses and realize gains) (Grinblatt & Han, 2002). Subsequent studies find empirical
evidence consistent with the underreaction explanation. For example, Frazzini (2006) finds
that bad news travels slowly among stocks trading at large capital losses and good news
travels slowly among stocks trading at large capital gains, in turn leading to price momentum. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find that stocks with higher trading volume exhibit
stronger momentum. Verardo (2009) documents that momentum profits are larger in portfolios with higher dispersion in analyst forecasts. Hong et al. (2000) show that the momentum
strategies work better in stocks with small size and low analyst coverage, consistent with
the underreaction hypothesis. Finally, Jiang et al. (2005) and Zhang (2006) find higher
momentum payoffs among firms with higher information uncertainty, proxied by firm size,
firm age, return volatility, cash flow volatility, and analyst forecast dispersion. In contrast,
some studies show that momentum effects are driven by overreaction. Examples include
investors’ delayed overreaction to stock-specific information (K. Daniel et al., 1998), investors’ herding behavior (Grinblatt et al., 1995), and investors’ return chasing behavior (Sirri
& Tufano, 1998).
It should be emphasized that we do not attempt to reconcile the underreaction versus
overreaction explanations. Instead, our research is built on the evidence of underreaction in
the momentum literature. If the momentum effects stem from investors’ underreaction to
firm-specific information, then we believe it is natural to ask whether and how much the
underreaction is related to the underreaction to cash flows.
Gu and Wu (2020) examine the role of accruals and find that momentum profits are
mostly concentrated in firms with high accruals. Our study differs from Gu and Wu (2020)
in three important ways. First, although accruals and cash flows have a strong negative correlation, cash flows contain distinctive information from accruals when predicting future
performance or future returns (Houge & Loughran, 2000; Hribar & Yehuda, 2015). Second,
unlike Gu and Wu (2020) that treat accruals as a partitioning variable and show the incremental effect of accruals on the relation between past returns and future returns, we examine whether past returns and FCFs predict future returns after controlling for the other.
Third, while Gu and Wu (2020) focus on CSMOM, we consider both CSMOM and
TSMOM.

Hypothesis Development
As discussed in the above sections, prior studies have widely documented the robustness of
price momentum and attributed the momentum effect to investors’ underreactions to the
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information contained in past returns (e.g., Barberis et al., 1998; Chan et al., 1996;
Frazzini, 2006; Griffin et al., 2005; Hong et al., 2000; Hong & Stein, 1999; Jegadeesh &
Titman, 1993; Verardo, 2009). Other studies have examined the relationship between cash
flows and future returns and attributed the underpricing of cash flows to investors’ underestimation of the valuation implication of cash flows (e.g., Desai et al., 2004; Houge &
Loughran, 2000; Lakonishok et al., 1994; Sloan, 1996). These two lines of research treat
the return predictability of past returns and cash flows as two separate phenomena.
We posit that, to the extent that the momentum effect and the cash flow effect stem
from investors’ underreaction to firm-specific information, the separate lines of research on
these two effects are developed on one implicit assumption: Past returns and cash flows
contain distinct information, and thus, price momentum and cash flow mispricing are two
distinct anomalies. However, there is no empirical evidence directly testing this assumption. We test this assumption by examining the joint distribution of future returns conditional on both past returns and cash flows. If past returns and cash flows contain distinct
information, we expect that (a) returns to the momentum strategy are not subsumed by
cash flows (and vice versa), and (b) an enhanced strategy that accounts for past returns and
cash flows will generate more significant excess returns than the traditional momentum
strategy.
Our predictions also build on prior research suggesting that cash flows and past returns
are unique valuation metrics and contain unpriced information distinct to other metrics.
Several studies show that the mispricing of cash flows is not subsumed by accruals, suggesting cash flows and accruals convey distinct information (Houge & Loughran, 2000;
Hribar & Yehuda, 2015). For the momentum effect, Chan et al. (1996) relate price momentum to the market’s underreaction to earnings news. They find that momentum strategies
are profitable after they control for earnings surprise, suggesting that past returns and earnings surprise capture different pieces of information that are not fully priced by the market
in a timely fashion. Chen et al. (2014) examine the profits of revenue and earnings surprises and price momentum strategies and find no dominant strategy among them, suggesting that revenue surprises, earnings surprises, and prior returns each carry some exclusive
unpriced information content.
Given the above, we specify two hypotheses in the alternative form:
Hypothesis 1: The momentum strategy and the FCF strategy contain distinctive
information for predicting future stock returns and neither can be subsumed by the
other.
Hypothesis 2: The enhanced momentum strategy of buying past winners with high
FCFs and shorting past losers with low FCFs generates larger excess returns than
the traditional momentum strategy.
However, our predictions are not without tension. It is possible that price momentum
and cash flow mispricing may capture a similar phenomenon. First, both anomalies document future returns linked to information about firm performance. Past returns are a stockprice-based measure that reflects the market’s perception of a firm’s prospect. Cash flows
indicate the accounting-based profitability level with relatively high persistence to the next
period. Both indicators are likely to be positively correlated. Second, prior research suggests that both anomalies are a result of the market’s underreaction to information. While
other explanations exist, the underreaction explanation—which predicts that prices adjust
slowly to new information and thus firms with high past returns are undervalued—appears
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to be the most promising behavioral explanation of the momentum effects (Barberis et al.,
1998; Chan et al., 1996; Hong & Stein, 1999). If the profitability of the momentum strategy
is due to the underreaction to cash flow information, then the momentum strategy will not
be profitable after controlling for cash flows.

Data and Method
Our sample consists of common shares (share Codes 10 and 11) traded on the NYSE or
AMEX from January 1965 to December 2015. We collect monthly return data from The
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and financial data from Compustat.
CSMOM and TSMOM both select winner and loser stocks by using past stock returns.
The key difference is that CSMOM assigns stocks to winner and loser portfolios based on
their relative performance, while TSMOM assigns stocks based on their absolute performance. For the CSMOM strategy, we construct the portfolios following Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993). At the end of each month (Month 0), stocks are sorted into quintiles based
on their returns from the past 6 months (from Month –5 to Month 0). For the TSMOM
strategy, we follow Moskowitz et al. (2012) and assign stocks with positive and negative
returns over the past 6 months (from Month –5 to Month 0) to the winner and loser portfolios, respectively. In both cases, we take a long position in the winner portfolio and a short
position in the loser portfolio. To avoid potential microstructure biases, we skip 1 month
(Month 1) between the end of the formation period and the beginning of the holding
period. The winner and loser portfolios are then held for 6 months (from Month 2 to
Month 7). All stocks priced less than US$5 at the beginning of the holding period are
excluded from the sample. Overlapping portfolios are constructed to increase the power of
our tests. Specifically, each portfolio contains selected stocks from the previous six formation months.
We measure FCFs as earnings (IB) less total accruals (ACC), with a broad definition of
accruals that includes all accruals relating to operating and investing decisions (Dechow
et al., 2008; Hribar & Yehuda, 2015; S. A. Richardson et al., 2005). Accruals (ACC) are
measured as the change in noncash assets (DAT DCHE) less the change in nondebt
liabilities (DLT DDLTT DDLC). FCFs are typically loosely measured as earnings
before depreciation less capital expenditures in finance literature. Nevertheless, this measure is noisy because it includes many accruals, such as working capital accruals and capitalization of long-term assets (Dechow et al., 2008; Hribar & Yehuda, 2015).
Following Dechow et al. (2008), we further decompose the FCFs into changes in the
annual cash balance (DCASH), net distributions to equity holders (DISTEQ ), and net distributions to debt holders (DISTD ). DCASH is change in the annual cash balance
(CHEt CHEt 1 ) and DISTEQ is annual net distributions to equity holders, measured by
the reduction in book value of equity (AT LT) plus earnings (IB). DISTD is annual net
distributions to debt holders, measured by the reduction in long-term debt and short-term
debt (DLTT + DLC).8 Financial variables are scaled by average total assets (AT) and
winsorized at 1% and 99% to eliminate the impact of extreme outliers.
Then we perform double sorting. In each month, we sort stocks independently based on
their past returns and FCF. Stocks are assigned to one of the five (two) CSMOM
(TSMOM) portfolios and one of the five FCF portfolios. For example, we run an independent double sorting based on past returns and FCF. The intersection between these two
sorts generates 25 (5 3 5) portfolios. We focus on the four extreme cases: CSMOM1 (past
losers, lowest past 6-month returns) with FCF1 (lowest FCF), CSMOM5 (past winners,
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highest past 6-month returns) with FCF1 (lowest FCF), CSMOM1 (past losers) with
FCF5 (highest FCF), and CSMOM5 (past winners) with FCF5 (highest FCF). We
compare the momentum payoffs (CSMOM5–CSMOM1) across FCF portfolios to examine
the incremental effects of FCFs. To test the impact of components of FCFs (DCASH,
DISTEQ , and DISTD ) on price momentum, we repeat the same double sorting for each
subcomponent, respectively.

Empirical Results
Effects of Price Momentum and FCFs on Subsequent Stock Returns
Table 1 reports the mean of the characteristics of portfolios formed on past returns
(CSMOM and TSMOM) or FCF. Panel A reports statistics of independently sorted portfolios, while Panel B reports statistics of intersected portfolios (e.g., CSMOM1 + FCF1 or
TSMOMNEG + FCF). There is no large dispersion in terms of firm characteristics across
CSMOM-, TSMOM-, or FCF-sorted portfolios, except for the accruals across FCF portfolios. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Dechow, 1994; Sloan, 1996), accruals and FCFs
have an inverse relationship, in which the average accrual is 0.03 for low FCF firms
(FCF1) and –0.08 for high FCF firms (FCF5).
Table 2 reports monthly returns of portfolios formed on past stock returns and FCF. In
Panel A, stocks are sorted into quintiles based on firms’ FCF and past 6-month returns for
the CSMOM strategy.9 Stocks are grouped into two portfolios on the sign of the past
6-month returns (positive or negative) for the TSMOM strategy. Each portfolio is then held
for 6 months (from Month 2 to Month 7) following the formation. Consistent with existing
empirical findings in the literature of momentum anomaly (e.g., Asness et al., 2013;
Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993) and cash flow valuation (e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1994; Sloan,
1996), our results show that either the information of historical stock returns or corporate
fundamentals of FCFs has not been fully reflected in the stock price. Specifically, results in
Panel A show that the trading strategies based on CSMOM, TSMOM, and FCF earn significant risk-adjusted returns of 0.75%, 0.48%, and 0.62%, respectively.
To investigate whether the momentum effect dominates FCFs in predicting future
returns (i.e., whether firms’ fundamental information from operating FCFs has any distinctive and incremental effects over the price momentum), we double sort stocks based on
their past returns and FCF. Two key results emerge from Panels B and C that report portfolio returns based on a two-way sorting. First, focusing on the monthly performance of
stand-alone and intersection portfolios formed on CSMOM (TSMOM) and FCF, we
observe that high FCF stocks continuously outperform low FCF stocks in both past loser
and past winner portfolios. Similarly, both CSMOM and TSMOM strategies yield positive
excess returns in low and high FCF groups. This outcome indicates that neither the momentum effect nor the FCF effect can be subsumed by the other, suggesting that FCF and price
momentum each contain unique and unpriced information. Second, a combination of low
past returns (CSMOM1 or TSMOMNEG) and low FCF (FCF1) disseminate strong negative
signals to investors and market participants (–0.47% per month for FCF1 3 CSMOM1 and
–0.31% for FCF1 3 TSMOMNEG). Similarly, stocks with high past returns (CSMOM5 or
TSMOMPOS) and high FCF (FCF5) experience the highest subsequent returns among
all four intersection portfolios (1.00% per month for FCF5 3 CSMOM5 and 0.39% for
FCF5 3 TSMOMPOS). In brief, the more desirable recent performance in stock returns, together
with optimistic fundamental data, delivers strong positive buying signals to the markets.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics.
Panel A: Single Sorted on Past Returns (CSMOM and TSMOM) or FCFs.
Variables

CSMOM1

CSMOM2

CSMOM3

CSMOM4

CSMOM5

5.42
–0.59
–0.23
–0.05
–0.02
1.18
0.02

6.01
–0.51
–0.06
–0.01
–0.03
1.03
0.02

6.22
–0.50
0.05
0.00
–0.03
1.03
0.02

6.29
–0.50
0.16
0.00
–0.03
1.16
0.02

5.91
–0.47
0.47
–0.01
–0.03
1.57
0.02

TSMOMNEG

TSMOMPOS

lnME
lnBM
Past returns
FCFs
Accruals
Volume
IVOL

5.74
–0.57
–0.17
–0.03
–0.02
1.11
0.02

6.17
–0.47
0.26
–0.01
–0.03
1.25
0.02

Variables

FCF1

FCF2

FCF3

FCF4

FCF5

lnME
lnBM
Past returns
FCFs
Accruals
Volume
IVOL

5.55
–0.60
0.08
–0.24
0.03
1.25
0.02

5.89
–0.41
0.09
–0.05
–0.01
1.18
0.02

6.11
–0.37
0.09
0.00
–0.03
1.09
0.02

6.28
–0.47
0.10
0.05
–0.04
1.17
0.02

6.09
–0.70
0.11
0.14
–0.08
1.28
0.02

lnME
lnBM
Past returns
FCFs
Accruals
Volume
IVOL
Variables

(continued)

Although neither the momentum effect nor the FCF effect can be subsumed by the
other, low FCF stocks generate 0.52% (0.34%) higher CSMOM (TSMOM) returns than
high FCF stocks. The greater CSMOM and TSMOM payoffs in the low FCF group are
mainly due to the significant underperformance in the portfolio of past losers with poor corporate fundamental data (FCF1). In accordance with the findings of Hong and Stein
(1999), this phenomenon may occur due to slow information diffusions. One possible
explanation for this situation could be that investors are more reluctant to realize losses or
have restrictions on building up a short position to gain profits on negative signals.
Meanwhile, firms may avoid communicating bad news explicitly, which subsequently
exacerbates market underreaction.
In sum, Table 2 provides evidence indicating that firms’ FCFs contain incremental information that cannot be entirely recognized by the price momentum. Low FCF stocks generate higher price momentum payoffs than the corresponding high FCF stocks. Among the
four intersection portfolios, past losers with low cash flows (CSMOM1 3 FCF1 or
TSMOMNEG 3 FCF1) suffer the worst performance during the holding period, while past
winners with high cash flows (CSMOM5 3 FCF5 or TSMOMPOS 3 FCF5) experience the
best subsequent performance.
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Table 1. (continued)
Panel B: Double Sorted on Past Returns (CSMOM and TSMOM) and FCFs.
Variables
lnME
lnBM
Past returns
FCFs
Accruals
Volume
IVOL
Variables
lnME
lnBM
Past returns
FCFs
Accruals
Volume
IVOL

CSMOM1 + FCF1

CSMOM1 + FCF5

CSMOM5 + FCF1

CSMOM5 + FCF5

5.05
–0.71
–0.26
–0.26
0.04
1.16
0.03

5.56
–0.76
–0.22
0.15
–0.08
1.28
0.02

5.64
–0.62
0.54
–0.25
0.02
1.71
0.02

5.88
–0.60
0.47
0.15
–0.08
1.66
0.02

TSMOMNEG + FCF1

TSMOMNEG + FCF5

TSMOMPOS + FCF1

TSMOMPOS + FCF5

5.29
–0.67
–0.20
–0.26
0.04
1.12
0.02

5.88
–0.76
–0.15
0.14
–0.08
1.19
0.02

5.76
–0.54
0.30
–0.23
0.02
1.35
0.02

6.21
–0.66
0.27
0.14
–0.08
1.33
0.02

Note. This table shows the means of main variables across portfolios formed with stocks traded on the NYSE and
AMEX between 1965 and 2015. Size (lnME) is the natural logarithm of market capitalizations, lagged 1 month.
Book-to-market (lnBM) is the natural logarithm of book value of equity over market value of equity. Past returns are
returns over 6 months (Months –5 to 0). Accruals are measured as the change in noncash assets less the change in
nondebt liabilities, scaled by average total assets. FCFs are earnings less accruals, scaled by average total assets.
Trading volume is past 6-month average turnover (trading volume over the number of outstanding shares). IVOL is
the standard deviation of the estimated residual following Fama–French three-factor model by using daily returns
over the previous month. Panel A reports portfolios formed independently on CSMOM, TSMOM, and FCF. At the
end of each month, all available stocks are sorted into five CSMOM portfolios or two TSMOM portfolios based on
past returns (Months –5 to 0) or five FCF portfolios based on FCF from their recent fiscal year ending at least 4
months before Month 0. There is a 1-month gap between the formation and the holding periods (Month 1), and all
portfolios are held for 6 months (Months 2–7). CSMOM1 and CSMOM5 (FCF1 and FCF5) represent the bottom and
top 20% of stocks, respectively. TSMOMNEG and TSMOMPOS represent time-series portfolios with negative and
positive returns over the past 6 months. Panel B reports the intersected portfolios formed on the independent
sorts. All stocks less than US$5 are excluded. CSMOM = cross-sectional momentum; TSMOM = time-series
momentum; FCFs = free cash flows.

In Table 3, we run a series of tests to examine the robustness of the baseline results. In
Panel A, we replace the equal-weighted monthly raw returns with the value-weighted
returns and then estimate the portfolio performance and their differences. Results are quantitatively similar to those tabulated in Table 2 in that the momentum profits are concentrated in low FCF stocks. Meanwhile, the FCF effect also cannot be explained by the
momentum effect and remains prominent. In Panel B, we estimate the performance of four
intersection portfolios based on 10 CSMOM (or two TSMOM) portfolios and three FCF
portfolios. In light of the finer partitions of CSMOM portfolios, the momentum effect
becomes more sizable among FCF portfolios (e.g., 1.36% and 0.71% CSMOM returns for
low and high FCF stocks, respectively) in comparison with the 5 3 5 portfolios. The FCF
effect remains strong despite the stronger price momentum effect.
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Table 2. Performance of Portfolios Formed on Past Returns and FCFs.
Panel A: Single Sorted on Past Returns or FCFs.
Portfolios
Q1
Q5
Q5 – Q1

CSMOM
0.09%
0.84%
0.75%

[0.28]
[3.30]
[4.32]

TSMOM
0.22%
0.70%
0.48%

[0.88]
[3.12]
[5.57]

FCF
0.17%
0.79%
0.62%

[0.59]
[3.48]
[7.14]

Panel B: Double Sorted on Past Returns (CSMOM) and FCFs.
FCF1 (lowest)

Portfolios
CSMOM1 (past losers)
CSMOM5 (past winners)
CSMOM5 – CSMOM1

–0.47%
0.60%
1.07%

[–1.30]
[2.03]
[5.04]

FCF5 (highest)
0.46%
1.00%
0.54%

[1.54]
[4.00]
[3.27]

FCF5 – FCF1
0.93%
0.41%
–0.52%

[7.60]
[4.13]
[–3.82]

Panel C: Double Sorted on Past Returns (TSMOM) and FCFs.
FCF1 (lowest)

Portfolios
TSMOMNEG (past losers)
TSMOMPOS (past winners)
TSMOMPOS – TSMOMNEG

–0.31%
0.42%
0.72%

[–1.01]
[1.56]
[5.94]

FCF5 (highest)
0.49%
0.88%
0.39%

[2.05]
[4.01]
[4.79]

FCF5 – FCF1
0.80%
0.46%
–0.34%

[7.73]
[5.51]
[–3.71]

Note. This table shows the average monthly excess returns (of the 1-month U.S. T-bill rate) of portfolios formed
with stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX between 1965 and 2015. Panel A reports portfolios formed
independently on firms’ past stock returns (CSMOM or TSMOM) or FCF. At the end of each month, all available
stocks are sorted into five CSMOM portfolios or two TSMOM portfolios based on their past 6-month returns
(Months –5 to 0) or five FCF portfolios based on firms’ FCF from their recent fiscal year-end ending at least 4
months before Month 0. All portfolios are held for 6 months (Months 2–7) along with a 1-month gap between the
holding period and the formation period (Month 1). Q1 and Q5 represent the bottom and top 20% of stocks in
terms of their past 6-month returns (CSMOM) and FCF, respectively. For TSMOM portfolios, Q1 and Q5
represent the portfolios with negative and positive returns over the past 6 months, respectively. Panel B (Panel C)
reports portfolios formed jointly on firms’ past CSMOM (TSMOM) and FCF sorts. The intersected portfolios
formed on two independent sorts, that is, 5 CSMOM (or 2 TSMOM) portfolios 3 5 FCF portfolios, are held for 6
months (Months 2–7), keeping a 1-month gap between the formation and the holding periods (Month 1). All
stocks less than US$5 are excluded; t-statistics are adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey and West
(1987) standard errors and are reported in brackets. FCFs = free cash flows; CSMOM = cross-sectional
momentum; TSMOM = time-series momentum.

In Panel C, we investigate the performance of portfolios using a longer window for the
formation and holding periods. Specifically, we extend both periods to 12 months and find
that the baseline patterns remain robust. Similar to the findings of previous studies (e.g.,
Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993; Lee & Swaminathan, 2000), the momentum payoff is less pronounced using longer holding periods. In Panel D, we replace the independent double sorting with the sequential double sorting, in which we first sort all stocks on past 6-month
returns into five CSMOM portfolios (or two TSMOM portfolios) and, within each quintile,
we then sort stocks based on their latest FCF into further quintiles. Our results are not
affected by the alternative double sorting technique.

Cross-Sectional Regressions
We use Fama–MacBeth cross-sectional regressions as another way to disentangle the
momentum and cash flow effects (Fama & MacBeth, 1973). Following Fama and MacBeth
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Table 3. Robustness Tests: Alternative Portfolio Construction.
Portfolios

FCF1 (lowest)

FCF5 (highest)

FCF5 – FCF1

Panel A: Value-weighted raw returns
CSMOM1 (past losers)
CSMOM5 (past winners)
CSMOM5 – CSMOM1
TSMOMNEG (past losers)
TSMOMPOS (past winners)
TSMOMPOS – TSMOMNEG

0.66%
1.40%
0.74%
0.62%
1.06%
0.44%

[2.06]
[5.40]
[3.26]
[2.46]
[4.78]
[3.83]

1.05%
1.37%
0.32%
0.91%
0.98%
0.07%

[4.17]
[6.48]
[1.62]
[4.79]
[5.58]
[0.75]

0.39%
–0.03%
–0.42%
0.29%
–0.08%
–0.37%

[2.26]
[–0.25]
[–2.17]
[2.01]
[–0.74]
[–2.89]

[0.77]
[3.63]
[2.89]
[2.08]
[3.99]
[4.51]

0.88%
0.23%
–0.65%
0.64%
0.36%
–0.29%

[6.34]
[2.19]
[–3.81]
[8.36]
[5.44]
[–4.17]

Panel B: Ten price momentum portfolios 3 Three FCF portfolios
CSMOM1 (past losers)
CSMOM5 (past winners)
CSMOM5 – CSMOM1
TSMOMNEG (past losers)
TSMOMPOS (past winners)
TSMOMPOS – TSMOMNEG

–0.59%
0.76%
1.36%
–0.15%
0.50%
0.65%

[–1.56]
[2.44]
[5.20]
[–0.53]
[1.99]
[5.99]

0.28%
0.99%
0.71%
0.49%
0.85%
0.36%

Panel C: 12-month formation period and 12-month holding period
CSMOM1 (past losers)
CSMOM5 (past winners)
CSMOM5 – CSMOM1
TSMOMNEG (past losers)
TSMOMPOS (past winners)
TSMOMPOS – TSMOMNEG

–0.09%
0.41%
0.50%
–0.11%
0.35%
0.46%

[–0.25]
[1.39]
[2.64]
[–0.35]
[1.32]
[4.31]

0.54%
0.86%
0.32%
0.58%
0.79%
0.21%

[1.72]
[3.49]
[1.98]
[2.32]
[3.59]
[2.35]

0.63%
0.45%
–0.18%
0.69%
0.44%
–0.25%

[5.28]
[5.55]
[–1.57]
[6.45]
[6.16]
[–2.95]

–0.61%
0.59%
1.19%
–0.38%
0.43%
0.81%

[–1.64]
[2.01]
[5.31]
[–1.22]
[1.65]
[6.25]

0.46%
1.00%
0.54%
0.49%
0.88%
0.39%

[1.50]
[3.99]
[3.20]
[2.07]
[3.98]
[4.67]

1.06%
0.41%
–0.65%
0.87%
0.45%
–0.42%

[7.76]
[4.00]
[–4.39]
[7.97]
[5.30]
[–4.10]

Panel D: Sequential sorting
CSMOM1 (past losers)
CSMOM5 (past winners)
CSMOM5 – CSMOM1
TSMOMNEG (past losers)
TSMOMPOS (past winners)
TSMOMPOS – TSMOMNEG

Note. This table shows the results of robustness checks on the intersected portfolios formed on past returns
(CSMOM, TSMOM) and FCFs. The sample includes all common stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX between
1965 and 2015. At the end of each month, all available stocks are sorted into five CSMOM portfolios or two
TSMOM portfolios based on their past 6-month returns (Months –5 to 0) or five FCF portfolios based on firms’
FCF from their recent fiscal year-end ending at least 4 months before Month 0. The intersected portfolios formed
on two independent sorts, that is, 5 CSMOM (or 2 TSMOM) portfolios 3 5 FCF portfolios, are held for 6 months
(Months 2–7), keeping a 1-month gap between the formation and the holding periods (Month 1). CSMOM1 and
FCF1 (CSMOM5 and FCF5) represent the bottom (top) 20% of stocks in terms of their past returns and FCFs,
respectively. TSMOMNEG (TSMOMPOS) represents stocks in time-series momentum with negative (positive) past
returns. Panel A reports the holding period returns of portfolios using the value-weighted average of monthly raw
returns. In Panel B, portfolios are formed by interacting 10 CSMOM (or two TSMOM) portfolios and three FCF
portfolios. Panel C reports average returns over a 12-month holding period (Months 2–13) of momentum
portfolios formed using a 12-month formation period (Months –11 to 0). Panel D reports results using the
sequential sorting, where stocks are first sorted into five CSMOM (or two TSMOM) portfolios based on their past
6-month returns and then further sorted into five equal groups based on FCF within each portfolio. All stocks less
than US$5 are excluded from the sample; t-statistics are adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey and West
(1987) standard errors and are reported in brackets. FCF = free cash flow; CSMOM = cross-sectional momentum;
TSMOM = time-series momentum.
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(1973) and Novy-Marx (2012), we include firm size (lnME) and book-to-market (lnBM) in
regressions as ‘‘catch-all’’ variables for controlling other influences on the cross-section of
stock returns. We also control for accruals, volume, and idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL),
which have been documented in prior research as return predictors. Recent research demonstrates that investment and external financing affect expected stock returns (Fama &
French, 2015; Hou et al., 2015; Penman & Zhu, 2022). Therefore, we further include
investment and external financing variables in Table 4 as controls.10
Regression results are reported in Table 4. We employ rank models to control for the
potential nonlinearity and outlier effects (Cheng & Thomas, 2006; Gu & Wu, 2020; Shi &
Zhang, 2012). All explanatory variables, except for TSMOM, are ranked into quintiles each
month. All quintile ranks are then scaled with values ranging from –0.5 to 0.5. TSMOM, by
definition, assigns stocks with positive and negative returns over the past 6 months to the
winner and loser portfolios. TSMOMrank takes a value of 0.5 for stocks in the winner portfolios and –0.5 for stocks in the loser portfolios.
The first column of Panel A shows that, over our sample period of 1965–2015, the coefficient on CSMOMrank and FCFrank is 0.501% and 0.669%, respectively (significant at the
1% level). This result provides strong support that CSMOM does not subsume FCF in predicting future returns, especially because the effects of size and book-to-market on returns
are addressed. This result holds in Columns (2) to (4) after controlling for accruals,
volume, IVOL, investment, and external financing. In Column (5), we further include the
interaction term (CSMOMrank 3 FCFrank). Consistent with results reported in the portfolio
analysis (Table 2), the negative coefficient on CSMOMrank 3 FCFrank indicates that the
momentum effect is stronger in low cash flow stocks. We repeat the analyses in Panel B by
replacing CSMOMrank with TSMOMrank and find similar results.
Overall, the results of Fama–MacBeth regressions are consistent with the two-way portfolio analysis of price momentum and FCF, supporting the predictions that FCFs contain
incremental information in terms of stock returns predictive power not fully captured by
the price momentum.

Performance of Enhanced Momentum Strategies
In Table 2, we observe that, in both CSMOM and TSMOM portfolios, past loser and past
winner portfolios experience decreased returns among low FCF firms compared with high
FCF firms, consistent with the slow information diffusion explanation. Apparently, investors’ failure to appreciate negative news exacerbates the payoff of shorting past loser portfolios, contributing to the greater momentum payoffs among low FCF firms.
To further demonstrate the economic benefits of employing firms’ fundamental information in momentum trading, we take past losers and low FCFs as a joint selling signal and,
oppositely, past winners and high cash flows as a joint buying signal. We then propose
new enhanced momentum strategies following the combined signal from past returns and
FCFs. For example, in the FCF-based CSMOM strategy, we take a long position in the
winner portfolio (CSMOM5) with high FCF (FCF5) and a short position in the loser portfolio (CSMOM1) with low FCF (FCF1), and then hold this zero-investment portfolio
(CSMOM5 3 FCF5 minus CSMOM1 3 FCF1) for 6 months over the holding period.
We report the monthly returns of the enhanced momentum strategies in Table 5 and
compare their performance with the simple price momentum strategy. In general, our new
trading strategy, taking the corporate fundamental cash flow information into account in
the technical analysis of historical returns, outperforms the traditional momentum strategy
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Table 4. Fama–MacBeth Regressions.
Explanatory Variables
Panel A: CSMOM
CSMOMrank
FCFrank
lnMErank
lnBMrank

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.501***
(2.679)
0.669***
(8.944)
–0.450**
(–2.382)
0.427***
(3.275)

0.420**
(2.290)
0.595***
(6.634)
–0.459**
(–2.275)
0.417***
(3.159)
–0.165*
(–1.801)

0.396**
(2.446)
0.558***
(7.079)
–0.683***
(–4.320)
0.467***
(3.755)
–0.186**
(–2.239)
0.612***
(6.058)
–0.176
(–0.953)

0.318*
(1.747)
0.312***
(3.316)
–0.622***
(–3.844)
0.472***
(3.518)
–0.132
(–1.416)
0.620***
(5.432)
–0.217
(–1.078)
–0.271***
(–2.930)
–0.232***
(–3.355)

1.236***
(5.014)

1.218***
(4.832)

1.216***
(4.822)

1.241***
(4.554)

0.302*
(1.658)
0.307***
(3.281)
–0.626***
(–3.866)
0.469***
(3.517)
–0.138
(–1.480)
0.625***
(5.477)
–0.208
(–1.031)
–0.266***
(–2.882)
–0.235***
(–3.407)
–0.596***
(–3.460)
1.246***
(4.575)

0.340***
(3.661)
0.732***
(7.872)
–0.488**
(–2.551)
0.450***
(3.169)

0.332***
(3.546)
0.578***
(6.323)
–0.500**
(–2.448)
0.441***
(3.114)
–0.188**
(–2.036)

0.278***
(3.205)
0.557***
(7.005)
–0.690***
(–4.343)
0.482***
(3.747)
–0.200**
(–2.390)
0.657***
(6.312)
–0.073
(–0.360)

0.238**
(2.411)
0.306***
(3.216)
–0.631***
(–3.878)
0.493***
(3.557)
–0.145
(–1.538)
0.661***
(5.628)
–0.116
(–0.526)
–0.267***
(–2.867)
–0.237***
(–3.442)

1.127***
(4.683)

1.112***
(4.523)

1.121***
(4.554)

1.144***
(4.304)

Accrualsrank
Volumerank
IVOLrank
Investmentrank
EXTFINrank
CSMOMrank 3 FCFrank
Constant
Panel B: TSMOM
TSMOMrank
FCFrank
lnMErank
lnBMrank
Accrualsrank
Volumerank
IVOLrank
Investmentrank
EXTFINrank
TSMOMrank 3 FCFrank
Constant

0.231**
(2.316)
0.356***
(3.328)
–0.633***
(–3.887)
0.487***
(3.520)
–0.146
(–1.551)
0.660***
(5.633)
–0.11
(–0.497)
–0.264***
(–2.852)
–0.237***
(–3.430)
–0.484***
(–3.447)
1.152***
(4.336)

Note. This table shows results of Fama–MacBeth regressions. CSMOM is the past 6-month returns (Months –5 to 0).
Investment is change in gross property, plant, and equipment plus change in inventory, divided by lagged assets. EXTFIN is
change in debt plus the change in equity from net equity transactions, scaled by average assets. All explanatory variables,
except for TSMOM, are ranked monthly into quintiles, with scaled values ranging from –0.5 to 0.5. TSMOMrank is –0.5 for
stocks with negative returns over the past 6 months (Months –5 to 0) and 0.5 for stocks with positive returns over the
past 6 months; t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey and West (1987)
standard errors and are applied with significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, which are represented by *, **, and ***,
respectively. CSMOM = cross-sectional momentum; FCF = free cash flow; TSMOM = time-series momentum.
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based solely on past returns. For example, we find that our FCF-based CSMOM strategy
(CSMOM + FCF) generates about 0.72% excess returns per month higher than what the
simple momentum strategy can achieve. Similarly, the FCF-based TSMOM yields 0.71%
additional returns per month compared with the profits from the stand-alone TSMOM
strategy.
We also examine the relative contribution of excess returns from the long and short legs
to understand the source of the improved profitability of the enhanced momentum strategy.11 Our results indicate that the improved payoffs derive mainly from the short leg. This
result holds for both the CSMOM + FCF strategy and the TSMOM + FCF strategy.
Specifically, 77.78% of the improved returns from the FCF-based CSMOM strategy come
from the short leg. Similarly, the relative contribution of the improved returns from the
short leg is 74.65% when comparing profits from the FCF-based TSMOM strategy with the
stand-alone TSMOM strategy. To investigate whether value weighting versus equal weighting affects the return patterns from the long and short legs of the trading strategies, we
repeat the test in Table 5 using value-weighted returns. Consistent with the equal weighting
results, we find that the main source of the improved payoffs of the enhanced momentum
strategies mainly comes from the short leg.12
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) and T. Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) document that the
returns distribution of the momentum strategy has significantly negative skewness and high
excess kurtosis, which leads to occasional large crashes (e.g., a crash of –62.51% from
March to May 2009). Our enhanced CSMOM strategy with fundamental cash flow components experiences a less negative skewness (–1.88) and a greater Sharpe ratio (1.14) in
comparison with the simple CSMOM strategy (i.e., –2.50 for skewness and 0.67 for the
Sharpe ratio).
We further conduct a series of sensitivity tests to examine whether the improved performance following our enhanced strategies is subject to the commonly documented timeseries factors that may affect the performance of the price momentum strategy. First, investor sentiment may play an important role in explaining the performance. Stambaugh et al.
(2012) and Antoniou et al. (2013), who argue that sentiment-driven investors can cause
market mispricing, show that momentum trading strategies are more profitable following
high levels of sentiment as the price anomaly is stronger corresponding to high sentiment.
Our results in Panels A and B of Table 6 lend support to this sentiment argument. Investor
sentiment is measured by (a) the monthly market-based sentiment index constructed by
Baker and Wurgler (2006) in Panel A and (b) the University of Michigan’s consumer sentiment index in Panel B. We find greater momentum gains following periods of positive
investor sentiment compared with negative sentiment periods. We describe results in Panel
A for brevity. For example, our enhanced CSMOM (TSMOM) strategies, on average,
improve the performance of price momentum by about 0.88% (0.84%) per month following
positive sentiment and by about 0.55% (0.59%) per month following negative sentiment.13
Second, we test whether the superior performance of the enhanced momentum strategy
is sensitive to sample periods. The disappearance of momentum gains after the 1990s has
attracted significant discussion (e.g., Barroso & Santa-Clara, 2015; T. Daniel &
Moskowitz, 2016; Hwang & Rubesam, 2015; McLean & Pontiff, 2016). We find corroborating results that the persistent gains for both CSMOM and TSMOM have declined considerably over the last two decades. We divide the whole sample into two subperiods (i.e.,
1965–1989 and 1990–2015), and the second subperiod is further broken down into two
shorter subperiods (i.e., 1990–1999 and 2000–2015).14 As presented in Panel C of Table 6,
the pure price momentum strategy generates significantly less positive returns after 1990,
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Table 5. Traditional Momentum Versus FCF-Enhanced Momentum.
Panel A: Monthly Raw Returns.
Portfolios

Long leg

CSMOM
CSMOM + FCF
Improvements in profits
Relative contributions
TSMOM
TSMOM + FCF
Improvements in profits
Relative contributions

0.84%
1.00%
0.16%
22.22%
0.70%
0.88%
0.18%
25.35%

Short leg

[3.30]
[4.00]
[3.22]
[3.12]
[4.01]
[4.66]

0.09%
–0.47%
–0.56%
77.78%
0.22%
–0.31%
–0.53%
74.65%

Long–short (profit)

[0.28]
[–1.30]
[–7.15]

0.75%
1.47%
0.72%

[4.32]
[6.85]
[7.70]

[0.88]
[–1.01]
[–7.07]

0.48%
1.18%
0.71%

[5.57]
[8.44]
[8.21]

Panel B: Descriptive Statistics.
Statistics

CSMOM

CSMOM + FCF

TSMOM

TSMOM + FCF

9.40%
0.14
–2.50
19.28
0.67

19.17%
0.17
–1.88
10.66
1.14

5.86%
0.07
–1.28
6.98
0.80

15.17%
0.11
–1.31
6.24
1.33

Mean
Standard deviation
Skewness
Kurtosis
Sharpe ratio

Note. In this table, Panel A shows the average monthly returns of the traditional momentum (CSMOM, TSMOM)
and FCF-enhanced momentum strategies, and Panel B shows their mean annual returns, standard deviation,
skewness, excess kurtosis, and Sharpe ratio. The Improvements in Profits raw captures the difference between
CSMOM (TSMOM) + FCF and CSMOM (TSMOM), and the Relative Contributions raw reports the proportion of
Improvements in Profits from the Long or Short Leg over the total improvements from the Long–Short (Profit). The
sample includes all common stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX between 1965 and 2015. At the end of each
month, all available stocks are sorted into five CSMOM portfolios or two TSMOM portfolios based on their past
6-month returns (Months –5 to 0) or five FCF portfolios based on firms’ FCF from their recent fiscal year-end
ending at least 4 months before Month 0. The CSMOM strategy involves buying past winner stocks (CSMOM5) and
selling past loser stocks (CSMOM1). The TSMOM strategy involves buying past positive-return stocks (TSMOMPOS)
and selling past negative-return stocks (TSMOMNEG). The FCF-enhanced momentum strategies involve buying
CSMOM5 (or TSMOMPOS) with the highest FCF and selling CSMOM1 (or TSMOMNEG) with the lowest FCF. All
portfolios are held for 6 months (Months 2–7) along with a 1-month gap between the holding period and the
formation period (Month 1). All stocks less than US$5 are excluded from the sample; t-statistics are adjusted for
serial correlation using the Newey and West (1987) standard errors and are reported in brackets. FCF = free cash
flow; CSMOM = cross-sectional momentum; TSMOM = time-series momentum.

and the positive gain even disappears during 2000–2015. However, our enhanced strategies
boost the performance of the traditional momentum strategy, evidenced by the remained
strong positive profits after 1990 (CSMOM + FCF returns = 1.14%, t-value = 3.24;
TSMOM + FCF returns = 0.95%, t-value = 4.29).
Overall, our enhanced momentum strategies appear to be robust in terms of improving
the performance of the traditional price momentum strategy.

Decomposition of FCFs
As argued by Dechow et al. (2008), retained cash shows less persistency compared with
the distribution parts to equity and debt holders. Hence, the subcomponents of FCFs may
play different roles in predicting future returns. To further investigate the price impact of
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Table 6. Sensitivity Tests of FCF-Enhanced Momentum Strategies to Time-Series Variation.
Portfolios

Portfolio monthly
returns

Differences =
Enhanced – MOM

Portfolio
monthly returns

Differences =
Enhanced – MOM

Panel A: Investor sentiment (Baker & Wurgler, 2006)
Positive
CSMOM
CSMOM + FCF
TSMOM
TSMOM + FCF

0.92%
1.80%
0.52%
1.37%

[5.63]
[9.10]
[5.70]
[9.66]

Negative

0.88%

[8.20]

0.84%

[8.88]

0.63%
1.18%
0.48%
1.07%

[2.25]
[3.47]
[3.58]
[5.01]

0.55%

[4.14]

0.59%

[4.81]

Panel B: Investor sentiment (Michigan’s consumer sentiment index)
High
CSMOM
CSMOM + FCF
TSMOM
TSMOM + FCF

1.13%
1.85%
0.68%
1.40%

[6.17]
[7.77]
[6.41]
[7.81]

Low

0.72%

[4.88]

0.73%

[5.85]

0.29%
0.86%
0.25%
0.85%

[0.94]
[2.38]
[1.67]
[3.72]

0.57%

[4.06]

0.60%

[4.51]

Panel C: Subperiods
1965–1989
CSMOM
CSMOM + FCF
TSMOM
TSMOM + FCF

0.94%
1.82%
0.59%
1.43%

[5.09]
[7.82]
0.87%
[5.68]
[8.69]
0.84%
1990–1999

CSMOM
CSMOM + FCF
TSMOM
TSMOM + FCF

0.88%
1.70%
0.55%
1.31%

[2.64]
[4.28]
[3.19]
[4.67]

1990–2015
[7.23]
[7.08]

0.82%

[4.69]

0.76%

[5.20]

0.57%
1.14%
0.37%
0.95%

[1.95]
[3.24]
0.57%
[2.75]
[4.29]
0.58%
2000–2015

0.37%
0.79%
0.25%
0.72%

[0.89]
[1.57]
[1.37]
[2.35]

[4.13]
[4.75]

0.42%

[2.18]

0.47%

[2.69]

Note. This table shows the sensitivity of the FCF-enhanced momentum strategies to different levels of investor
sentiment and time periods. The level of investor sentiment is measured using Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) and the
University of Michigan’s consumer investor sentiment index. The sample includes all common stocks traded on the
NYSE and AMEX between 1965 and 2015. At the end of each month, all available stocks are sorted into five
CSMOM portfolios or two TSMOM portfolios based on their past 6-month returns (Months –5 to 0) or five FCF
portfolios based on firms’ FCF from their recent fiscal year-end ending at least 4 months before Month 0. The
CSMOM strategy involves buying past winner stocks (CSMOM5) and selling past loser stocks (CSMOM1). The
time-series momentum strategy involves buying past positive-return stocks (TSMOMPOS) and selling past negativereturn stocks (TSMOMNEG). The FCF-enhanced momentum strategies involve buying CSMOM5 (or TSMOMPOS)
with the highest FCF and selling CSMOM1 (or TSMOMNEG) with the lowest FCF. All portfolios are held for 6
months (Months 2–7) along with a 1-month gap between the holding period and the formation period (Month 1).
All stocks less than US$5 are excluded from the sample; t-statistics are adjusted for serial correlation using
the Newey and West (1987) standard errors and reported in brackets. MOM = stand-alone momentum strategy;
FCF = free cash flow; CSMOM = cross-sectional momentum; TSMOM = time-series momentum.
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individual components within the FCF, we decompose FCFs into changes in the annual
cash balance (DCASH), net distributions to equity holders (DISTEQ ), and net distributions
to debt holders (DISTD ). As shown in Panel A of Table 7, both distributions to equity
holders and debt holders exhibit strong and positive effects on future returns, whereas the
change in the cash balance has little impact on future returns. This outcome indicates that
information of changes in cash balance can be quickly incorporated into stock prices,
while the price reflection of distributions to equity/debt holders remains relatively slow.
Panel B of Table 7 shows that the momentum effect is exacerbated among low distributions to equity/debt holder groups but remains unchanged across retained cash flow
groups. This further suggests that only distributions to equity/debt holders contain incremental and unpriced information over price momentum.

Further Analyses
To explore whether alternative explanations for the FCF mispricing may affect our main
findings, we consider three nonmutually exclusive explanations: accrual anomaly, limits-toarbitrage, and risks.

Enhanced Momentum and Accruals
S. Richardson et al. (2010) argued that failure to recognize the difference of persistence
across various earnings components is a primary driver of the accounting anomalies. Firms
with low FCFs are likely to be associated with high accruals. Therefore, the underpricing
on FCFs may be attributable to investors’ overpricing on accruals. Gu and Wu (2000) document that price momentum is more pronounced for high accrual firms, especially for firms
with high discretionary accruals. To eliminate the possibility that the incremental cash flow
effect on price momentum arises from the accrual effects, we divide the whole sample into
high and low accrual groups based on the (a) total accruals, (b) discretionary accruals, and
(c) growth in net operating assets.15 Online Appendix Table A1 reports the monthly returns
of momentum and FCF-enhanced momentum portfolios for firms with high and low
accruals. Our enhanced momentum strategies consistently outperform the simple momentum strategy in both high and low groups formed on three accrual-based measures. This
outcome suggests that the accrual anomaly cannot fully explain the incremental role of
FCFs in momentum effects.

Enhanced Momentum and Limits-to-Arbitrage
Limits-to-arbitrage are important reasons that stop arbitrageurs from taking trading positions to eliminate the anomalies (Ali et al., 2003; Arena et al., 2008; Lam & Wei, 2011).
We, therefore, test the sensitivity of the improved performance of our enhanced momentum
strategy to limits-to-arbitrage, measured by transaction costs (bid–ask spread, Amihud’s illiquidity, dollar trading volume, and institutional ownership) and arbitrage risk (idiosyncratic
volatility) (Ali et al., 2003; Amihud, 2002; Huang et al., 2010; Lam & Wei, 2011).
Variables’ definitions and the results are provided in Online Appendix Table A2. We first
divide all stocks into high and low groups based on the above limits-to-arbitrage measures
and then compare the performance of the enhanced trading strategy with the stand-alone
price momentum strategy.

20

Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance

Table 7. Portfolios Formed on Past Returns and Further Decomposed FCFs.
Panel A: Single Sorted on Decomposed FCF.
Portfolios
Q1 (lowest)
Q5 (highest)
Q5 – Q1

DCASH
0.54%
0.57%
0.02%

DISTEQ
[2.16]
[2.23]
[0.53]

0.24%
0.74%
0.50%

[0.82]
[3.56]
[4.65]

DISTD
0.30%
0.73%
0.43%

[1.11]
[2.81]
[6.95]

Panel B: Double Sorted on Past Returns (CSMOM) and Decomposed FCFs.
Portfolios

DCASH1 (lowest)

DCASH5 (highest)

DCASH5 – DCASH1

CSMOM1 (past losers)
CSMOM5 (past winners)
CSMOM5 – CSMOM1

0.10%
[0.30]
0.82%
[3.04]
0.72%
[3.73]
DISTEQ1 (lowest)

0.02%
[0.07]
0.86%
[3.23]
0.84%
[4.47]
DISTEQ5 (highest)

–0.08%
[–0.81]
0.04%
[0.56]
0.11%
[1.03]
DISTEQ5 – DISTEQ1

CSMOM1 (past losers)
CSMOM5 (past winners)
CSMOM5 – CSMOM1

–0.34%
[–0.98]
0.64%
[2.09]
0.98%
[5.32]
DISTD1 (lowest)

0.43%
[1.47]
0.93%
[4.07]
0.50%
[2.73]
DISTD5 (highest)

0.77%
[5.81]
0.29%
[2.25]
–0.48%
[–3.58]
DISTD5 – DISTD1

CSMOM1 (past losers)
CSMOM5 (past winners)
CSMOM5 – CSMOM1

–0.38%
0.69%
1.08%

0.25%
1.02%
0.77%

0.63%
0.33%
–0.30%

[–1.14]
[2.51]
[5.48]

[0.75]
[3.71]
[4.56]

[5.92]
[4.03]
[–2.48]

Panel C: Double Sorted on Past Returns (TSMOM) and Decomposed FCFs.
Portfolios

DCASH1 (lowest)

DCASH5 (highest)

DCASH5 – DCASH1

TSMOMNEG (past losers)
TSMOMPOS (past winners)
TSMOMPOS – TSMOMNEG

0.19%
[0.72]
0.68%
[2.85]
0.48%
[4.68]
DISTEQ1 (lowest)

0.14%
[0.53]
0.71%
[2.95]
0.57%
[5.62]
DISTEQ5 (highest)

–0.05%
[–0.70]
0.03%
[0.73]
0.08%
[1.14]
DISTEQ5 – DISTEQ1

TSMOMNEG (past losers)
TSMOMPOS (past winners)
TSMOMPOS – TSMOMNEG

–0.22%
[–0.74]
0.45%
[1.61]
0.67%
[5.86]
DISTD1 (lowest)

0.45%
[2.03]
0.78%
[4.01]
0.33%
[3.63]
DISTD5 (highest)

0.67%
[5.50]
0.33%
[2.82]
–0.34%
[–3.83]
DISTD5 – DISTD1

TSMOMNEG (past losers)
TSMOMPOS (past winners)
TSMOMPOS – TSMOMNEG

–0.20%
0.53%
0.73%

0.39%
0.84%
0.45%

0.58%
0.30%
–0.28%

[–0.69]
[2.14]
[6.57]

[1.43]
[3.33]
[5.01]

[6.96]
[4.64]
[–3.53]

Note. This table shows the average monthly excess returns (of the 1-month U.S. T-bill rate) of portfolios formed
on past stock returns and the decomposed FCFs, including changes in the annual balance (DCASH), net
distributions to equity holders (DISTEQ), and net distributions to debt holders (DISTD). Panel A reports portfolios
formed independently on one of the decomposed elements of FCF. At the end of each month, all available stocks
are sorted into five portfolios based on DCASH, DISTEQ, or DISTD, and then held for 6 months (Months 2–7) along
with a 1-month gap between the holding period and the formation period (Month 1). Q1 and Q5 represent the
bottom and top 20% of stocks in terms of their DCASH, DISTEQ, or DISTD, respectively. Panel B (Panel C) reports
monthly returns of portfolios formed on CSMOM (TSMOM) and the decomposed FCF. At the end of each month,
all available stocks are independently sorted into five CSMOM (or two TSMOM) portfolios based on their past
6-month returns (Months –5 to 0) and five portfolios based on firms’ recent DCASH, DISTEQ, or DISTD. The
intersected portfolios formed on the two independent sorts are held for 6 months (Months 2–7) along with a
1-month gap between the formation and the holding periods (Month 1). All stocks less than US$5 are excluded;
t-statistics are adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey and West (1987) standard errors and are reported
in brackets. FCFs = free cash flows; CSMOM = cross-sectional momentum; TSMOM = time-series momentum.
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Consistent with prior research that attributes the momentum effect to the mispricing
(e.g., Arena et al., 2008), we find greater payoffs of both the stand-alone and the enhanced
momentum strategies in the group of high limits-to-arbitrage (i.e., high bid–ask spread,
high Amihud’s illiquidity, low dollar trading volume, low institutional ownership, and high
idiosyncratic volatility). We also find that the superior performance of our enhanced
momentum strategy is not dominated by arbitrage constraints because the positive-return
differences between the enhanced and the traditional momentum strategies remain significant in both high and low limit-to-arbitrage groups.

Enhanced Momentum and the Risk Explanation
To eliminate the possibility that risk explains the profits of the intersection portfolios and
the improved performance of the enhanced momentum strategy, we repeat the portfolio
analysis using returns adjusted by firm characteristics and returns estimated from different
risk factor models. First, we use size-adjusted returns, size- and book-to-market-adjusted
returns, and industry-adjusted returns. Panel A of Online Appendix Table A3 presents
results for two-way sorts based on price momentum and FCF. We find that both the
momentum and FCF effects continue to hold, and that the incremental effect of FCF to
momentum payoffs remains significant. Panel B of Table A3 compares the returns from the
enhanced momentum strategies with the returns from the stand-alone momentum strategies.
We find that the performance differences are comparable with results in Table 5, where
raw monthly returns are employed.
Second, we report the alphas for the intersection portfolios and the alphas for the
momentum strategies estimated from six asset pricing models, including the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) model, Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model, Fama and
French’s (2015) five-factor model, a model with FF three factors plus the Pástor and
Stambaugh’s (2003) liquidity factor, Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, and Hou et al.’s
(2015) q-factor model.16 Results in Online Appendix Table A4 support our findings that
the incremental effect of FCFs and the improved profitability of the FCF-based momentum
strategies cannot be explained by the common risk factors. Panel A presents the alphas for
the two-way sorting portfolios based on price momentum and FCF. Results show that
momentum payoffs are consistently larger in low FCF stocks and that higher momentum
payoffs in low FCF portfolios are mainly driven by large negative returns among past
losers with low FCF (e.g., CSMOM1 3 FCF1). Panel B reports the alphas for the enhanced
and the stand-alone momentum strategies. We find that the profitability improvement of
the enhanced momentum strategies remains robust and prominent regardless of the set of
risk factors employed.17

Earnings Momentum, Price Momentum, and Cash Flow Effects
Finally, we examine the interplay among earnings momentum, price momentum, and the
cash flow effect.18 Results are presented in Online Appendix Table A5. We start by testing
the association between earnings momentum and price momentum. We use earnings surprises (SUE) to construct portfolios of earnings momentum. Panel A provides evidence that
price momentum is distinct from earnings momentum as one is not subsumed by the other.
Next, we investigate the role of FCFs in the relation between earnings momentum and
price momentum. We partition our sample into high- and low-FCF groups and rerun the
two-way sorting portfolio analyses. Panels B and C show that for firms with high FCF,

22

Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance

both earnings momentum and price momentum demonstrate weaker portfolio returns. In
contrast, the stronger earning and price momentum effects for low FCF stocks indicate that
firms with low FCF contain unpriced information.
In addition, we extend the FF three factors with a mimic factor of earnings surprises
(SUE factor) to test whether the price momentum and the FCF-enhanced momentum can
be explained away by the SUE factor. Panels D and E report the estimated regression
alpha. Results in Panel D show that the FCF effects, for both past loser and winner stocks,
cannot be explained by the common risk factors and the added SUE factors. However, the
positive performance of CSMOM and TSMOM disappears for stocks with high FCF when
we control for the SUE factor, suggesting that the combined explanatory effect of FCFs
and earnings surprises is prominent. Results in Panel E indicate that while the inclusion of
the SUE factor has almost fully explained the traditional CSMOM and TSMOM,19 the
FCF-enhanced CSMOM and TSMOM strategies continue to present superior performance.
Their differences with the stand-alone price momentum in terms of portfolio performance
remain around 0.70% and are highly significant.

Additional Concerns
Does the rebalancing frequency affect our results? Momentum strategies require monthly
rebalancing of portfolios and their compositions. While past returns can easily be calculated
at the monthly frequency, corporate fundamentals, such as FCF, are updated annually,
meaning that the compositions of each FCF-sorted portfolio remain unchanged for a horizon of 12 months. How does this blend of monthly rebalancing and largely fixed portfolio
composition mechanically affect our main results? We re-examine the performance of
intersection portfolios formed on annually rebalanced price momentum and FCF portfolios.
Results show that the FCF-enhanced momentum portfolios continue to generate sizable
returns (1.02% for CSMOM + FCF and 0.93% for TSMOM + FCF per month) that significantly outperform the respective stand-alone price momentum, indicating that our results
are robust to this alternative rebalancing frequency.20

Excluding small firms or glamor stocks with extraordinary performance? The FCF-based
momentum strategies require buying past winners with high FCF and selling past losers
with low FCF. As small firms tend to experience large negative returns and low FCF and
glamor firms, such as FAANG (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google), often
deliver extraordinary performance with high returns and FCF, our main results may be
affected by the inclusions of these firms. To rule out the possibility that our results are
driven by small firms or glamor firms, we repeat our main analyses—portfolios formed on
past returns and FCF, Fama–MacBeth regressions, and FCF-enhanced momentum
strategies—using (a) the sample that excludes firms below the bottom 20% of FF NYSE
size breakpoint, and (b) the sample that excludes firms below the bottom 20% FF NYSE
book-to-market breakpoint. We find robust results with both samples: (a) FCF and
momentum effects generate positive portfolio returns, and neither of them is subsumed
by the other; and (b) the FCF-enhanced CSMOM and TSMOM generate sizable positive
monthly returns, which are also significantly higher than the traditional price momentum
portfolios.21

An alternative measure of FCF based on the statement of cash flows. We measure FCF as
earnings less total accruals. While prior research has demonstrated some advantages of this
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balance sheet approach (Dechow et al., 2008; Hribar & Yehuda, 2015), items in the statement of cash flow provide an alternative way to measure FCF—operating cash flow minus
capital expenditure, scaled by average total assets. As the statement of cash flow items are
available in Compustat since 1987, we supplement the annual FCF using the balance sheet
approach for pre-1987 information. We then repeat our main tests and find that our results
are robust to this alternative measure of FCF. Our untabulated results show that the
momentum strategy (CSMOM and TSMOM) and the FCF strategy yield significant profits
after controlling for the other. The enhanced momentum strategy after incorporating FCF
generates higher returns than the traditional momentum strategy.

Conclusion
This study focuses on the incremental value of FCFs to the traditional price momentum
trading. We find that FCFs contain exclusive and unpriced information that can bring incremental value to the pure momentum trading strategies. Our follow-on proposed enhanced
trading strategy, buying past winners with high FCFs and shorting past losers with low
FCFs, generates better payoffs than the traditional momentum strategy. Further analysis
shows that distributions to equity/debt holders—a component of FCFs with a high persistence level—contribute the most to the momentum performance. Cash flows are a major
information source that reflects the financial fundamentals for investors’ evaluation of a
firm. Our research offers a good example of identifying the incremental value of accounting information and provides guidance for incorporating fundamental analysis into the technical trading strategies for potential improvements.
Our conclusions are subject to limitations. First, we may be failing to control for some
unknown risk factors that might account for our findings. In the absence of a theoretical
asset pricing model where momentum and cash flows are observed in equilibrium, it is
impossible to eliminate the possibility that our findings are due to an omitted risk factor.
Although we conduct a battery of robustness tests, our evidence can, at best, indicate that
the set of well-known risk factors fails to explain the profits from the enhanced momentum
strategy. Second, although we show that the profitability from the enhanced momentum
strategy remains significant in recent years, it will likely be attenuated in future years if
more arbitrageurs are attracted to trade on this strategy. Future research interested in the
interaction between FCFs and price momentum should take these limitations into
consideration.
Our analyses also suggest several ideas for future research. We document that the
enhanced momentum strategy outperforms the traditional momentum strategy. Future
research can examine sources that affect returns on the long and short legs to advance the
understanding of the performance of this trading strategy. In addition, we show that
momentum profits are higher in low cash flow firms. Future research can investigate economic rationales to explain this phenomenon. We also find it remarkable that the profits
from the cash flow strategy are at par with the momentum profits in magnitude and cannot
be explained by risk factor models. Compared with price momentum, the pricing effect of
cash flows receives considerably less attention in prior studies. Future research can focus
on cash flows and examine cross-sectional variations and alternative explanations for the
cash flow anomaly.
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Notes
1. See ‘‘Netflix analysts continue to focus on growth, overlook cash flow’’ at https://www.marketwatch.com/story/netflix-analysts-continue-to-focus-on-growth-overlook-cash-flow-2018-01-23

2. In contrast, accruals, the other component of earnings, have been extensively studied. For exam3.

4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

ple, see Sloan (1996), Xie (2001), Fairfield et al. (2003a, 2003b); S. A. Richardson et al. (2005),
and Shi and Zhang (2012).
The survey results in S. Richardson et al. (2010) show that the most highly cited research paper
on anomalies since 2000 is that of Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), who focus on momentum strategies. The responses received from the practitioner and academic respondents indicate that 47%
(35%) of practitioners and 70% (26%) of academics viewed return momentum strategies as successful (neutral).
Subsequent studies provide several nonmutually exclusive explanations of the source of price
momentum. See our Relevant Literature section for more discussion. We advance the understanding of price momentum by following the research avenue proposed by Chan et al. (1996)
and focusing on the role of cash flow, an important accounting-based performance measure that
is overlooked in prior momentum literature.
We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting the test on time-series momentum (TSMOM).
Our study focuses on whether the mispricing of free cash flows (FCFs) and the price momentum
are related and whether a strategy of buying past winners with high FCFs and shorting past
losers with low FCFs outperforms the traditional momentum trading strategy. Although our analyses show robust evidence that price momentum is stronger in low cash flow firms, a close
examination on the reasons of this cash flow effect is beyond the scope of our study. We leave it
for future research.
We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the tests on TSMOM.
Negative (positive) values of DISTEQ indicate equity issuances (distributions). Negative (positive) values of DISTD indicate debt issuance (repayments).
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9. We extract firms’ FCFs from their annual financial statement for the fiscal year ending at least 4
months before the portfolio formation period (Month 0).

10. We thank the editor and the anonymous referee for suggesting the control variables.
11. We thank the anonymous reviewer for this insightful observation and suggesting this test.
12. In particular, our value-weighted results show that the enhanced CSMOM (cross-sectional

13.
14.
15.

16.

17.

18.
19.
20.
21.

momentum) and TSMOM strategy outperforms the corresponding stand-alone strategy by 0.28%
and 0.23% per month, respectively. Also, when comparing the long and short legs, we find that
67.9% (73.9%) of the improvements in the CSMOM + FCF strategy (the TSMOM + FCF strategy) are from the short leg. Results are not tabulated but available upon request.
The Baker and Wurgler sentiment index can be downloaded from Professor Jeffrey Wurgler’s
online webpage: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/
Results are quantitatively similar if we repeat the subperiod analysis using industry-adjusted
returns.
Xie (2001) documents that the accrual anomaly is driven by discretionary accruals. Fairfield
et al. (2003a) argue that the accrual anomaly is simply a special case of growth anomaly—A key
point is that accruals capture growth in net operating assets. In our Online Appendix Table A1,
discretionary accruals are estimated following Kothari et al. (2005). Alternatively, we estimate
discretionary accruals following Dechow et al. (1995) and Xie (2001), and find similar results in
terms of the performance of enhanced momentum strategies. Results are available upon request.
We also constructed a cash flow factor and added it to the standard asset pricing models. We
thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this test. In particular, the FCF factor is added to the
Fama–French (FF) three-factor model and the Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) q-factor model to
examine the risk-adjusted returns of intersected portfolios formed on past returns and FCF and
the performance of FCF-enhanced momentum strategies. In a comparison with the regression
alphas using the FF three factors, our results (not tabulated) indicate that the FCF factor contributes to the risk factor model by explaining a sizable portion of the performance of CSMOM
and TSMOM, but the enhanced explanatory function of the FCF factors is less obvious for the
Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) q-factor model. Nevertheless, the FCF factor still cannot fully
explain the FCF-enhanced price momentum effect, for both cross-sectional and time-series cases,
as indicated by the significant alphas from the FF 3 factor + FCF factor model and the Hou,
Xue, and Zhang (2015) q-factor + FCF factor model for the enhanced momentum strategy. This
shows that interacting CSMOM/TSMOM with FCF predicts returns incremental to the standalone FCF factor. Results are untabulated for brevity.
Results in Online Appendix Table A4 show that, among the six asset pricing models we use, the
Carhart’s model and the Hou et al.’s (2015) q-factor model have the strongest explanatory power
on momentum performance. In both panels, the momentum payoffs for the CSMOM strategies
are weak when measured by alphas from the Carhart’s model and the q-factor model. However,
the momentum effects are not fully eliminated under both models because the CSMOM returns
remain significant in low FCF firms and the TSMOM returns remain significant in both high and
low FCF firms. Our enhanced strategies also continue to be significant and outperform the price
momentum when using alphas from both models.
We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting the tests in this section.
As a comparison, when we use only the FF 3 factors, the regression alphas for CSMOM and
TSMOM are .83% (t-value = 5.33) and .51% (t-value = 6.49), respectively.
To economize space, empirical results discussed in the ‘‘Additional Concerns’’ section are not
tabulated but available upon request.
To further test that our results are not driven by small firms, we also rerun the sensitivity tests of
FCF-enhanced momentum strategies to limits-to-arbitrage by using size-adjusted return to control
for the implication of size effect on the analysis. Our results remain materially similar
(untabulated).
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